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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-2386 
___________ 
 
TAMMY YORI, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JUDGE STEPHANIE DOMITROVICH;  
BRADLEY K. ENTERLINE;  
MICHAEL RUIZ, DPM 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1:15-cv-00083) 
District Judge:  Honorable Barbara Jacobs Rothstein (sitting by designation) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 26, 2016 
Before:  FISHER, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed:  June 7, 2016) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 On March 18, 2015, Tammy Yori, representing herself, sought to file an in forma 
pauperis (“ifp”) complaint to allege that all of her civil and constitutional rights were 
violated earlier that day in a proceeding at the Erie County Court of Common Pleas.  
Specifically, she claimed that her ex-husband, his lawyer, and a Court of Common Pleas 
judge denied that she had an active appeal in our court and lied when they stated that her 
federal appeals and one of her district court cases had been dismissed.   
 The District Court concluded that Yori qualified financially for ifp status, but that 
her complaint violated Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, failed to state a 
claim, and sought damages against a defendant who is immune from such relief.  The 
District Court granted Yori leave to amend her complaint but notified her that future 
failure to comply with Rule 8 would result in dismissal of her suit.   
 Within a motion for extension of time to file an amended complaint, Yori included 
(in the event her motion was denied) an amended account of her claims.  She alleged that 
the Erie Court of Common Pleas and the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania “took all of [her] civil and constitutional rights from [her].”  She claimed 
that her ex-husband and others committed some sort of fraud “in disclosing facts” or 
“reporting to the United States Supreme [sic].”  She further alleged that “the Court 
allowed” her ex-husband to abuse her.  She submitted lengthy exhibits (including the 
transcript of the March 18, 2015 proceedings in the Erie County Court of Common Pleas) 
in support of her filing.  
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 The District Court concluded that the amended complaint failed to comply with 
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and dismissed it.  Yori appeals.1   
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  While we exercise plenary 
review over the District Court’s dismissal of a complaint, see Tourscher v. McCullough, 
184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), we review the District Court’s dismissal of a complaint 
for failure to comply with Rule 8 for an abuse of discretion.  See In re Westinghouse Sec. 
Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 702 (3d Cir. 1996).  Summary action is appropriate when, as in this 
case, no substantial issue is raised on appeal.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 
10.6.    
 Even construing Yori’s allegations liberally because she is a pro se litigant, see, 
e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (per curiam), it cannot be said that 
she met the basic pleading requirements.  Rule 8 requires, inter alia, a pleading to contain 
“a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” and “a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
8(a)(1), (2).  Her claims were broad and vague; they were not “‘simple, concise, and 
direct.’”  In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d at 702 (quoting Rule 8(e)).  Her 
amendment was even more difficult to understand than her initial complaint, and neither 
it nor the initial complaint was drafted in a way to put the defendants on notice of the 
claims against them.  For these reasons, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
dismissing Yori’s complaint without further leave to amend.  See Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
                                              
1 We allow her to proceed ifp on appeal.   
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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (explaining that although “detailed factual 
allegations” are not required, there must be “enough to raise a right to relief above the 
speculative level”); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (discussing 
Twombly and noting that the pleading standard of Rule 8 “demands more than an 
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”); Grayson v. Mayview 
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).  
 We will affirm the District Court’s order.       
